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COMMENT
SMOKE, MIRRORS, AND NCAA BYLAW 12.2.4.2.1:
AN ANALYSIS OF COLLEGE BASKETBALL'S
TIURTY-DAY RULE AND THE CONTINUED
EXPLOITATION OF COLLEGE CAGERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Voshon Lenard starred for the University of Minnesota basketball
team during the years 1991-94.1 Throughout the winter of 1993 and
spring of 1994, Lenard maintained that he would return to Minnesota for
his senior season.2 However, on May 10, 1994, Lenard had a change of
heart and decided to enter the National Basketball Association
("NBA") draft.3 When Lenard announced his decision at a press confer-
ence on May 11, it appeared that his collegiate career was over.4
Draft prognosticators predicted that Lenard would be selected in the
late first-round or early second-round.5 However, Lenard fell to the
forty-sixth overall pick, late in the second round, where he was drafted
by the Milwaukee Bucks.6 Milwaukee selected both Glenn Robinson of
1. Lenard's statistics for his first three years at the university are as follows:
Year FG% FT% Reb. Ast. Pts/gm.
1991-92 .421 .812 118 8 12.8
1992-93 .481 .802 113 82 17.1
1993-94 .472 .844 123 74 18.9
Totals .461 .818 354 242 16.3
In 1993, Lenard led his team to an NIT championship and was named MVP of the tourna-
ment. In 1994, Lenard led the Gophers to the second round of the NCAA tournament. Den-
nis Bracklin, Lenard Tells Bucks He Will Return to 'U', STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis). July 13,
1994, at 1C.
2. Id.
3. Lenard would not have had the choice of entering the draft after his junior season but
for the actions of Spencer Hayvood. Before 1971, NCAA rules prohibited players from en-
tering the draft until their college class had graduated. In 1971 Haywood, who starred at the
University of Detroit and won a gold medal with the 1968 Olympic basketball team, sued the
NCAA for the right to enter the draft prior to the end of his senior season. Haywood v. NBA,
401 U.S. 1204 (1971). The court ruled in favor of Hayvood, ruling that the NCAA's restraint
prevented him from earning a living. Id.
4. Lenard stated that playing in the NBA "is what I want to do." Bracklin, supra note 1, at
1C.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Purdue University7 and Eric Mobley of the University of Pittsburgh'
prior to selecting Lenard. Both Robinson and Mobley signed multi-mil-
lion dollar contracts, and Robinson's contract was the richest in NBA
history.9 Lenard was offered a one-year contract at the NBA minimum
salary of $ 150,000.10
Had Lenard announced his eligibility for the NBA draft after his
sophomore season, he would not have been able to return to school. He
would have been forced to either accept the Bucks' offer, play basketball
in the Continental Basketball Association ("CBA") or overseas, or wait
for the next year's NBA draft in hopes of obtaining a better draft posi-
tion and salary offer.1 However, in 1994 the NCAA offered Lenard a
new alternative. The NCAA created a new rule under which underclass-
men who enter the NBA draft are allowed to maintain their NCAA eli-
gibility if they declare their intention to resume intercollegiate
participation within thirty days after the draft12 and do not enlist the
services of an agent.13 The NBA team drafting the player, however, re-
tains the player's rights until one year after the exhaustion of his col-
legiate eligibility.14 On July 12, 1994, Lenard told the Bucks that he
7. Robinson, known as the "Big Dog," was the first pick overall. Id.
8. Mobley, a center, was selected 18th overall. Id.
9. Robinson received a ten year contract worth approximately $70 million. Toni Ginnetti,
Robinson Agrees to Big Bucks, Cm. SuN-TMms, Nov. 4, 1994, at 134. Mobley agreed to a four
year, $4.64 million contract. Bucks Ignore Robinson and Sign Mobley, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 12,
1994, at B14.
10. Bracklin, supra note 1, at 1C.
11. For example, Tony Farmer of the University of Nebraska decided to enter the 1991
NBA draft after his junior year, in which he averaged 12.4 points and 7.4 rebounds per game.
Although Farmer was projected to be selected in the late first- or second-round, he was not
drafted. Instead, Farmer pursued his pro dream in Europe and the CBA. Mike Terry, For
Many, The Pros Have Cons, WASH. PosT, May 21, 1994, at C1.
12. NCAA bylaw 12.2.4.2.1, reprinted in National Collegiate Athletic Association, 1994-
95 NCAA MANUAL 74 (1994)[hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
13. Specifically, NCAA bylaw 12.3.1 states:
An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if he or she
ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletic ability or reputation in that sport. Further, an agency
contract not specifically limited in writing to a sport of particular sports shall be
deemed applicable to all sports, and the individual shall be ineligible to participate in
any sport.
Reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, at 74.
14. Ed Reinke, New Draft Makes for... RISKY BUSINESS, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 15,
1994, at 10.
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would return to the University of Minnesota for his final year of
eligibility.' 5
Many have criticized NCAA bylaw 12.2.4.2.1, which allows college
basketball players to return to school after testing the NBA waters.'6
Much of this criticism centers on the rule's effect on both the NBA teams
that draft underclassmen 7 and the college teams whose players declare
their eligibility for the NBA draft before the end of their senior
seasons.
1 8
The NCAA did not enact this legislation for the benefit of college
coaches or NBA teams, however. The legislation is intended to benefit
college basketball players who declare their eligibility for the NBA draft
and are struck by the reality of their own basketball talents when the
NBA either fails to draft them or drafts them at a lower position than
anticipated. 19 Although this legislation benefits some college basketball
players, many still criticize the rule for its potential adverse affects on the
players themselves."z
Many who criticize the NCAA rule as harming players cry for its
rescission. The players would be better suited, however, by other meas-
ures. The thirty day window for negotiating with the NBA does not al-
low a player to make an informed decision, and this problem is
compounded because the NCAA does not allow the player to be repre-
sented by an agent when negotiating a contract.
Part II of this Comment will address the thirty-day rule's effect on
both college and NBA teams. Part III will address the rule's effect on
college basketball players. Finally, Part IV will argue that players should
be allowed an unlimited time to negotiate with the NBA and propose the
means by which players can challenge the NCAA's thirty-day rule. This
15. Bracklin, supra note 1, at 1C. Lenard was far from unwavering in his decision. As
recently as June 30, 1994, Lenard told his college coach and father that he had no intention of
returning to the Gophers, and planned to play for the Bucks in the fall. Id.
Besides Lenard, Charles Claxton, a center for the University of Georgia, was the only
other player to take advantage of the NCAA's 30-day rule. Claxton, unhappy being drafted
50th overall by the Phoenix Suns, returned to school for his senior season. David Nakamura,
Giving College a Second Chance, WASH. PoTr, Dec. 26, 1994, at C7.
16. A proposal surfaced at the 1995 convention that would have rescinded the 1994 legis-
lation. This proposal failed, however. Jonathan Feigen, NCAA Convention Notes, Tim Hous-
TON CHRON., Jan. 11, 1995, at 3.
17. See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
19. See Reinke, supra note 14, at 10.
20. See infra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
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Comment will conclude that the NCAA should change its rules to level
the playing field for players when negotiating professional contracts.
II. EFFECT ON COLLEGE AND NBA TEAMS
A. College Teams
When college coaches criticize the thirty-day rule with respect to its
effect on their teams,21 most point to the adverse effect that it will have
on recruiting. First, when an underclassman declares his eligibility for
the draft, a coach does not know whether the player will return to
school, and thus does not know whether to recruit a high school player
to replace him.22 If a coach assumes that a player will not return and
recruits another player to fill his scholarship spot, the school may not
have a scholarship available for the player if he decides to return to
school. 23 Conversely, if a coach assumes that a player will return to
school and does not recruit an athlete to replace him, the team will suffer
if the player decides to sign a professional contract.
Second, the uncertainty about whether a player will return to school
also may adversely affect a coach's ability to persuade a high school
player to sign a letter of intent.24 If a coach is recruiting a prospect who
plays the same position as the player who declared his eligibility for the
draft, the coach is unable to tell the player whether he will start, come off
the bench, or even play the next year because of the uncertainty at the
position.25 As a consequence, the high school player might choose to
attend another institution where his role is more certain.
Another concern of college coaches is the possibility that a player
may decide to quit school in the middle of the college basketball season
21. Despite an initial positive reaction to the rule, college coaches voted overwhelmingly
against the 30-day rule at the 1994 National Association of Basketball Coaches' issues summit.
Of approximately 100 Division I coaches attending the summit, only two (Kansas' Roy Wil-
liams and Notre Dame's John MacLeod) supported the measure. Steve Wieberg, Coaches
Call for an End to NBA Draft Rules, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 1994, at 10C.
22. Said Denny Crum, head coach of the Louisville Cardinals: "It obviously is not in the
university's best interest because you can't tell until it is too late whether or not you can
recruit someone else. Your recruiting will be over for that particular year." Jerry Vizig,
NCAA Tournament, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 25, 1994, at 1.
23. "I think [the rule] creates a problem for your team," said Clem Haskins. "Now, all of
a sudden, you've been out recruiting this kid to replace a guy who you think is going to the
draft. So, you get this (recruit) to sign a national letter of intent and then the guy he was
supposed to replace comes back. I think it creates a problem for your team." L.C. Johnson,
Coaches Oppose Back-To-School Option, THE PLAiN DEALER, Oct. 5, 1994, at 2D.
24. For a discussion of letters of intent, see ROBERT C. BERRY & GLENN W. WONG, LAW
AND BusiNEss OF THE SPORTS INDusTms 170-75 (1993).
25. See Reinke, supra note 14, at 10.
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in order to join the team that drafted him. The probability that this
would occur increases under several scenarios. First, a player could be
struggling academically and, rather than working harder in school, drop
out in order to avoid the problem of achieving passing grades. Second, a
disgruntled player may decide to turn pro instead of resolving the prob-
lem with his coach.26 Third, the NBA team that drafted the player could
experience injury problems at the player's position, and therefore offer
the player a more substantial salary to induce him to enter the NBA
mid-season.27 Fourth, a player might develop his skills sufficiently to in-
duce the NBA team to make him a suitable offer. Finally, the player
may realize that although the NBA is not willing to pay him the millions
of dollars for which he had dreamed of playing, even the NBA minimum
salary is a substantial sum of money.
B. NBA Teams
The thirty-day rule does not have as dramatic an effect on the NBA
as it does on college teams and players.28 The first reason for this is the
difference in talent levels between the NCAA and the NBA. Every
NBA team's roster is composed mainly of players who starred at the
intercollegiate level. College teams usually have very few "blue-chip"
players. When a star collegian joins an NBA team, the team's talent
level usually does not change dramatically because there are a number
of players with comparable ability on the team. However, when a star
player leaves an NCAA team, the team's talent level can be dramatically
affected, especially when the team did not recruit a player to replace the
departing star.
The second reason for the disparity involves the players that will take
advantage of the thirty-day window. Most star players that will dramati-
cally impact the success of an NBA team are drafted early in the first
round. These players are ordinarily offered multimillion dollar con-
tracts, and probably will accept them as a result. The players likely to
take advantage of the thirty-day rule are those players who are disap-
pointed that they were chosen late in the draft or not selected at all.
NBA teams probably do not consider these players to be impact players,
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. "[The rule] is not going to have a dramatic effect on us," said Pete Babcock, general
manager of the Atlanta Hawks. Nick Canepa, New Basketball Rule Proves Once Again that
NCAA is a Basket Case, THE S.D. UNION-TRi., Jan. 18, 1994, at D1.
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and therefore the teams will not be adversely affected by the players'
decisions to return to school.
The rule has not avoided criticism by the NBA, however. The rule
has mainly been criticized as helping elite NBA teams and harming the
weak ones. Ordinarily the strong teams do not have an immediate need
for a player at a particular position. Thus, these teams can draft players
based on potential and refrain from signing the players immediately.
This allows the player to develop in college while retaining his eligibil-
ity.29 Weaker teams, however, probably need a player to contribute im-
mediately. The immediate need for a player's contribution, coupled with
a player's ability to return to school, gives the player increased bargain-
ing power in negotiations, and may force the team to pay the athlete
more than it would need to without the rule.30
The rule has also been criticized for giving additional leverage to
players who do not wish to play for the team that drafted them. In this
scenario, a player may coerce a team into trading him by threatening
that he will return to school if forced to play for the drafting team.3 '
III. EFFECT ON PLAYERS
Despite the thirty-day rule's effect on NCAA and NBA teams, most
commentary on the rule concerns its impact on players. Many NCAA
and NBA coaches as well as players have lobbied both in favor of and
against the legislation because of its effect on players. This section will
discuss the arguments both for and against this rule.
A. Proponents' Arguments
Proponents of the rule cite several arguments when supporting the
rule. First, players should be able to test the job market in their chosen
profession without the NCAA forcing them to abandon their scholar-
ships.32 Students with academic scholarships are allowed to solicit em-
29. According to Bob Whitsitt, president of the Seattle Supersonics, one of the NBA's
more successful teams: "With respect to our situation, the ruling is only positive. I can't see it
hurting us in any way. We're in a situation right now, where in the last couple drafts, we
haven't relied on that player coming out and helping us immediately. We're in a developmen-
tal mode for our young players." Mike Kahn, Testing the NBA Waters: NCAA Rule Gives
Players New Options, NEws TRm., Feb. 1, 1994, at D1.
30. Again, according to Whitsitt: "If you're a team relying on one or two draft picks play-
ing 25 minutes in the rotation, it may put you in a more difficult situation because you're
counting on those rookies to make a difference right away." Id.
31. Ray Glier, Gannett News Service, Jan. 17, 1994.
32. "Student-athletes should have the opportunity to investigate professional sports op-
portunities in the same way other students have the right to explore employment options,"
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ployment offers without losing their scholarships; students with athletic
scholarships should be allowed to do the same. Second, the threat of
returning to school will give players increased leverage when negotiating
with NBA teams. 3 Third, the rule helps players who receive poor ad-
vice. Previously, a player could be advised that he would be drafted high
in the first round, announce his eligibility for the draft, not get drafted,
and be precluded from returning to school on his basketball scholarship.
Now these same players are allowed to return to school and finish their
degrees when they learn that a career in the NBA might not be in their
future.34
B. Opponents' Arguments
Those against the thirty-day rule cite a multitude of arguments in
support of their position. Opponents argue that the rule will encourage
more advisors and NBA teams to encourage players to turn pro than
before.35 Accordingly, opponents argue that more student-athletes will
abandon their education than before. However, statistics from the 1994
NBA draft tend to refute this argument. In 1994, twenty underclassmen
applied for early entry into the NBA draft, only one more than the
number of underclassmen that applied for the 1993 draft.3 6
Opponents also point to extenuating circumstances that might pre-
clude a player from returning to school when the player wants to exer-
cise his thirty-day option. First, when an underclassman declares his
draft eligibility, his college team might recruit another player in anticipa-
tion of the draftee not returning to school. If the player decides to re-
turn to school, the university might not have a scholarship slot
said Ole Miss athletic director Warner Alford, who introduced the thirty-day rule legislation.
NCAA Will Let Players Return After NBA Draft, COM. APPE.a., Jan. 12, 1994, at 3D.
33. See Shaun Powell, Draft Dodge, THE SPORTING NEWs, Jan. 24, 1994, at 40.
34. According to Dean Smith, head coach at North Carolina: "[The rule] gives the student
athlete leverage in dealing with the pros, and if he's not drafted, the fact that he can still play
NCAA basketball might inspire him to return to college, finish his studies, and get his de-
gree." Ken Davis, Denying the Entry Pass: Coaches Tired of Underclassmen Making Early
Exits, Tr HARTFORD CouRANT, June 26, 1994, at Dl.
35. According to John Thompson, head coach at Georgetown: "All that [the rule is] going
to do is encourage the professional people to solicit the kids to come out of school, and we
don't need anymore pressure than we already have on these kids." Kisha Ciabattari, Thomp-
son Not a Proponent of New Eligibility Rule, WASH. TIMVs, Jan. 12, 1994, at B5. "It introduces
more people into support systems or advice systems who shouldn't be in there," said Mike
Krzyzewski, head coach at Duke University. "I'm very concerned about its impact on college
basketball." Davis, supra note 34, at Dl.
36. Johnson, supra note 23, at 2D.
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available.37 Second, players who decide to return to school must return
any money they received from an NBA team for participating in any
minicamps or summer leagues.3 8 Players who come from poor families
may not be able to repay the NBA team and, therefore, might be re-
quired to forfeit their NCAA eligibility despite the thirty-day rule.39
Third, some players might abandon their academics when declaring
themselves eligible for the draft, reasoning that their future is in the
NBA and not in academics. In the event that a player is not drafted, he
may be unable to catch up on his studies to remain academically
eligible.40
In addition, opponents point to the rule's potential adverse effects on
a player who improves in the years after he is drafted and returns to
school.4 ' For example, an undeveloped player could turn pro after his
sophomore year, be drafted in the late second-round, and return to
school. In the player's junior and senior seasons, the player could de-
velop to the point where he would be a lottery selection in the NBA
draft. However, the team that originally drafted him retains his rights
for one year after his graduation.42 The team may try to negotiate the
player's salary based on the position in which he was originally drafted
instead of on his present potential.43 The team's negotiating position
could cause the player to sign for a lower salary than if the player would
have entered the draft after his senior year.44 Some argue that this posi-
tion is overstated, however, and that the NBA will need to pay a player
37. See Gene Wojciechowski, NCAA Change Dumb to Some, L.A. TIMES, June 28, 1994,
at Cl. NCAA Division I schools are only allowed to have 13 scholarship players.
38. See NCAA bylaw 12.1.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, at 70. Voshon
Lenard needed to return approximately $2,000 to the Milwaukee Bucks prior to returning to
school. Johnson, supra note 23, at 2D.
39. Regarding the Voshon Lenard situation, coach Clem Haskins noted that "luckily,
Voshon comes from a middle-class family who could afford to pay the money back. But what
if he didn't have the money? That would be another problem for the coaches." Johnson,
supra note 23, at 2D.
40. Of the 20 underclassmen that applied for the 1994 NBA draft, seven were not drafted,
and none of these seven returned to school. Some of these seven were unable to return be-
cause of a lack of grades. Id.
41. See Kahn, supra note 29, at Dl.
42. See Reinke, supra note 14, at 10.
43. "[I]f a player is going to go back to college because he either doesn't like the team
that drafted him or he was drafted lower than he anticipated, when he eventually does enter
the NBA, the team that owns his rights will pay him the money at the spot where he got
drafted even though, later on, he might be a lottery-type talent. That's the risk to the student-
athlete," stated Stu Jackson, former head coach at the University of Wisconsin. Rob Schultz,
NCAA Rule on NBA Draft Has Jackson Seething, CAP. TImES (Madison), Jan. 24, 1994, at 4B.
44. "[S]tudents who may go out and get drafted low and then decide to come back to
school are stuck with that low draft number when they do come out. It will cost them money
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his present market value instead of the market value for the slot in which
he was originally selected.45
Finally, opponents argue that the rule adversely affects a player's bar-
gaining power with the NBA. First, opponents argue that the thirty-day
window does not give players a sufficient amount of time to negotiate a
contract with an NBA team.46 As a result, some players will return to
school without having a sufficient opportunity to negotiate a professional
contract. Others may decide to not return to school before the end of
the thirty-day period in hopes that they will negotiate a suitable contract
with the NBA. These players will lose their bargaining leverage because
they cannot threaten to return to school if an acceptable contract is not
offered. Second, because players are not allowed to retain agents while
negotiating with NBA teams, the players or their advisors may not know
their present market value when negotiating a contract. The NBA might
take advantage of this fact and sign players for less than their fair market
value.
IV. POTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THIRTY-DAY RULE
A. Thirty-Day Rule Should Be Expanded or Eliminated
The NCAA should not repeal the thirty-day rule for college basket-
ball players, but should expand the rule to give players a greater oppor-
tunity to consider their NBA options while maintaining their NCAA
eligibility. The NCAA should give players an unlimited time period to
negotiate with the NBA while keeping their eligibility. The thirty-day
time period does not give players sufficient time to negotiate a contract.
At the expiration of the thirty days, players are forced to decide whether
to continue to negotiate or return to school. Both decisions could have
an adverse effect on players. Players who continue to negotiate lose the
leverage that accompanies the option of returning to school, and may be
forced to sign a less lucrative contract. Players who decide to return to
school may be better suited for life in the NBA than life in the class-
room, but may end up taking another year of "Mickey Mouse" courses
because they were hindered by the thirty-day rule.
being held to those draft positions," said Pat Kennedy, coach at Florida State. Tony Ginnetti,
Pac-lO Challenges Draft Rule, Cm. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at 25.
45. Said Michael McNeely, the NCAA's director of operations: "If a kid goes back to
school and has a banner year, the market will be in place. He can hold out. I don't think he'll
be penalized." Reinke, supra note 14, at 10.
46. See Canepa, supra note 28, at D1.
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In addition, an expansion in the time period to negotiate with the
NBA does not disadvantage college coaches. This Comment does not
propose that a scholarship slot be left open indefinitely for a player who
is deciding whether to pursue an NBA career. If a coach decides to sign
a player to fill the scholarship slot left in limbo by the draftee, the player
should be allowed to transfer to another university. This solution would
benefit both the player's original university, the university to which he
transfers, and the player himself.
Finally, the thirty-day rule serves little purpose because a player
could still sign with the NBA team that drafted him after announcing his
intention to return to school. The only student-athletes that the thirty-
day rule harms are those athletes who abide by the letter and intent of
the rule and cease negotiations with the NBA at the close of the thirty-
day period. A player who returns to school but continues to negotiate
with the NBA is not sanctioned.
College cagers4 7 should seek to change the NCAA's thirty-day rule
because they would benefit if they were allowed an unlimited amount of
time to negotiate with the NBA without losing their college eligibility.
Considering the fact that most college coaches want to return to the sys-
tem in which draftees automatically lose their eligibility,48 players proba-
bly cannot look to the NCAA for help. The only recourse that players
may have is to challenge the thirty-day rule through the court system.49
The NCAA's thirty-day rule is vulnerable to attack as an unreasona-
ble restraint on college basketball players in violation of the antitrust
47. The term "cager" is slang for a basketball player. In 1896, five years after James Nais-
mith invented basketball in Springfield, Massachussets, the first professional basketball game
took place in Trenton, New Jersey, in a court enclosed by a 12-foot high wire-mesh fence. The
cage around the court was necessary because Naismith's original rules stated that when the
ball went out of bounds, the first player who got to it could throw it back in. The cage kept the
ball from going out of bounds, and thus prevented players from diving into the laps of front
row spectators to wrestle for the ball. Although the out-of-bounds rule was changed in 1902
to eliminate sideline scrimmages, the cage was kept to keep the game faster and more enter-
taining because there were no delays to retrieve the ball when it went out of play. See Robert
W. Peterson, When the Court Was a Cage, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 11, 1991, at 61.
48. See Wiebert, supra note 21, at 10C.
49. In response to the NCAA's exploitation of student-athletes, Reggie White of the
Green Bay Packers, who has admitted accepting money while playing at the University of
Tennessee, has suggested an alternative means of recourse for players: simply strike for
money. Said White: "Some of these athletes are going to get mad and they're going to walk.
They're not going to play. They're going to finally realize what the NCAA is doing to them.
Is it fair for the university to keep making millions and millions of dollars off a kid? Every-
body says, 'Well, they're getting a scholarship.' That's true. But do you have enough money
to wash your clothes, which they don't? Do you have money to go to the movies, which they
don't?" See RICK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 45 (1989).
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laws. This section will discuss the legal theories premised on antitrust
law that players could use to challenge the restraints that the NCAA
places on their career choices.
B. Loss of Eligibility After Thirty Days: An Antitrust Attack Against
the NCAA
The thirty-day rule is vulnerable to attack on antitrust grounds. Alle-
gations that the NCAA rules restrain trade are ordinarily based on Sec-
tion I of the Sherman Act, which forbids "[e]very contract, combination
. or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. ' 50 The NCAA is not exempt
from antitrust liability as a non-profit organization. The Supreme Court
ruled in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar that an organization is subject to
antitrust scrutiny regardless of whether it is nonprofit or has noncom-
mercial goals.5
In NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, the
Supreme Court confirmed that the NCAA is subject to antitrust scrutiny,
and ruled that courts should use a "Rule of Reason" analysis when de-
termining whether NCAA rules violate the Sherman Act.5 2 The Rule of
Reason analysis was first introduced by the Supreme Court in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States,53 and was further defined by the Court
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.54 Under
Rule of Reason analysis, a court must look to the "market impact" of the
challenged restraint.5 To prevail under the Rule of Reason approach,
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
51. 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
52. 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984). See also McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988);
Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D.
Ariz. 1983). Courts use either a "per se" or "rule of reason" approach when determining
Section 1 liability. The per se rule labels certain restraints of trade as inherently illegal with-
out further inquiry. The per se approach is applied, for example, to price fixing, see United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); and group boycotts, see Fashion Origi-
nators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
53. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). In this opinion, the Court stated:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or prob-
able. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant factors.
Id. at 238.
54. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
55. Id. at 690, 692.
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players must satisfy two requirements.56 First, players must prove that
the thirty-day rule has anticompetitive effects on a discernible market. 7
Second, players must demonstrate that the thirty-day rule is not a "justi-
fiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and
therefore [is not] procompetitive on the whole."5"
1. First Prong of Rule of Reason Analysis
The NCAA's thirty-day rule has an anticompetitive effect on the
market for college basketball players.5 9 In this market, NCAA-affiliated
universities are purchasers of labor. Basketball players, as the suppliers
of labor, agree to compete in basketball games in exchange for tuition,
room, board, and other benefits.6 0 Absent the thirty-day rule, universi-
ties also could offer players the opportunity to return to school more
than thirty-days after the draft as part of the player's compensation.
However, because the NCAA prohibits member institutions from al-
lowing players to return to school more than thirty days after the draft, it
has categorically ruled out a term of employment that players would find
advantageous.61 Many courts have considered an agreement among em-
ployers to control a material term of employment as anticompetitive in
the labor market at issue.6'
The NCAA has argued against categorizing rules restraining its play-
ers as terms of employment, arguing that "there is no price competition
56. A player must establish standing to sue the NCAA as a threshold issue. A player
challenging the thirty-day rule can establish standing in two ways. First, he could show that he
was harmed by the anticompetitive nature of the rule. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1097
(7th Cir. 1992)(Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)("Banks II")(citing Cargill,
Inc. v. Monford of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-110 (1986)). Here, a player must show
that he was either precluded from returning to college because of the thirty-day rule or at a
disadvantage in contract negotiations because the thirty days had expired. See Banks II, 977
F.2d at 1097 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
As an alternative, a player can seek injunctive relief by showing "a threatened loss or
injury cognizable in equity ... proximately resulting from the alleged antitrust violations."
City of Rohnert Park v. Harris, 601 F.2d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961
(1980). Here, a player must show that he is considering entering the NBA draft, that he prob-
ably would be drafted, and that he may be forced to stay in school instead of declaring eligibil-
ity for the draft because of the potential adverse consequences of the rule.
57. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
58. Id. at 117.
59. See Banks II, 977 F.2d at 1095 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Banks II, 977 F.2d at
1095 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Nichols v. Spencer Int'l Press, Inc.,
371 F.2d 332, 335-36 (7th Cir. 1967).
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.. . for players because the 'price' . .. is determined by the school's
tuition, room, and board, not by the supply of and demand for play-
ers." 63 The NCAA is misguided in its assertion, however. If the price a
school paid for a player consisted solely of the value of the tuition, room,
and board, high-priced private schools would dominate intercollegiate
sports6 4 High-priced private schools do not dominate intercollegiate
sports, however, as evidenced by recent national championships by
UCLA in basketball65 and the University of Nebraska in football."
Therefore, the "price" that lures top players to attend a university does
not consist solely of tuition, room, and board. The compensation that
players evaluate in deciding which school to attend includes, among
other things: (1) the school's or coach's reputation for sending players to
the NBA or other professional leagues, (2) the school's or coach's com-
mitment to academics, (3) the school's ability to find the student-athlete
a high-paying job during the summer, and (4) the condition of the
school's training facilities.67 Absent the thirty-day rule, the amount that
schools offer players could also include allowing them to enter the NBA
draft and return to school at any time, as this term would attract more
quality players. Because the NCAA does not allow its members to offer
this type of compensation to student-athletes, it is reducing the means by
which member institutions can compete with other institutions in at-
tracting basketball players; as a result, the thirty-day rule is
anticompetitive.6 s
63. Banks II, 977 F.2d at 1096 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id. at 1096.
65. On April 3, 1995, UCLA defeated Arkansas, 89 to 78, for its eleventh national cham-
pionship but first in twenty years. J.A. Adande, Bruins Play Like Wizard's to Take Title 20
Years Later, UCLA Is the Champion Again, WASH. Posr, Apr. 4, 1995, at C1.
66. On January 1, 1995, Nebraska wrapped up its first national championship under coach
Tom Osborne with a 24 to 17 victory over Miami in the Orange Bowl, capping an undefeated
season. Andrew Bagnato, HEARTBREAK. FRUSTRATION. THAT BEST DESCRIBES
NEBRASKA'S PAST ORANGE BOWL EXPERIENCES. NO MORE. NOW IT'S...
FIRST IN THE LAND, Ciml. Tnm., Jan. 2, 1995, at 5.
67. See Banks II, 977 F.2d at 1096 (Flaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. See id. Although the NCAA was not originally organized to maximize the profits of
its member institutions, the process of a trade or professional association evolving into an
entity designed to reduce competition and therefore raise profits is not uncommon. Econo-
mists call this behavior the "by-product theory of cartel organization" because industries be-
gin to cartelize as a by-product of their efforts to solve an industrywide problem. The NCAA,
after forming to combat football violence and injuries, realized that athletic profits could be
maximized by the cartelization of intercollegiate athletics. One of the most effective ways to
cut costs was to decrease competition for athletes among universities; hence, out of NCAA
efforts to reduce costs came restrictions on the enticements that an athlete could be offered.
PAUL R. LAwRENCE, UNSPORTSMAKLIKE CONDUCr 39-40 (1987).
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2. Second Prong of Rule of Reason Analysis
In their quest to satisfy the second element of the Rule of Reason
test, players must demonstrate that anticompetitive aspects of the thirty-
day rule outweigh any procompetitive aspects that the NCAA cites in
support of the rule.6 9 In support of its restraints on student-athletes, the
NCAA has argued that its rules are procompetitive because they: (1)
preserve amateurism in college sports,70 (2) permit the marketing of col-
lege sports as a product distinct from the product of professional
sports,71 and (3) prevent the professionalization of college sports at the
expense of educational values.72 When looking at the reality of big-time
college sports instead of the NCAA's rhetoric, however, one can see that
the NCAA's arguments are fundamentally flawed.
First, the NCAA has long abandoned the ideals of amateurism. 73
Many players attend college strictly to train for a professional sports ca-
reer, and view games as showcases for professional scouts and not as a
means to receiving an education.74 The revenues of Division I-A sports
programs has been estimated at one billion dollars per year,75 and indi-
vidual football programs have posted profits in excess of two million dol-
lars.76 For the NCAA to extol the virtues of amateurism while at the
same time profiting from the players they seek to limit is pure
hypocrisy.77
69. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
70. Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 860 (N.D. Ind. 1990)("Banks I").
71. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101-02; McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344
(5th Cir. 1988); Banks 1, 746 F. Supp. at 861; United States v. Walters, 711 F. Supp. 1435, 1442
(N.D. Iii. 1989).
72. See Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 123, 133 (White, J., dissenting); McCormack, 845
F.2d at 1344 (5th Cir. 1988); Banks I, 746 F. Supp. at 861; Walters, 711 F. Supp. at 1442 (N.D.
III. 1989).
73. The definition of the word "amateur" is somewhat elusive. In the 1870s, the British
Amateur Rowing Association declared that no person is an amateur "who is or ever has been
by trade or employment for wages a mechanic, artisan, or labourer or engaged in any menial
duty." Amateurism has almost always been defined not in terms of what it is but in terms of
what it is not, and therefore there probably never has been a successful, workable definition of
the term. RONALD A. SMITH, SPORTS AND FREEDOM 166-67 (1988).
74. Lee Goldman, Sports and Antitrust: Should College Students Be Paid to Play?, 65 No-
TRE DAME L. REv. 206, 234 (1990).
75. Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992)("Banks II")(citing National Col-
legiate Athletic Association, Revenues and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs 15
(1990).
76. Id. (citing D. Devenzio, Rip Off U: The Annual Theft and Exploitation of Major Col-
lege Revenue-Producting Athletes 106-08 (1986)).
77. Allan Sack has hypothesized that the NCAA's hypocrisy is particularly evident to
black athletes and athletes from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Regarding poor athletes,
Sack notes:
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The NCAA is not even able to argue that amateurism is a time-
honored tradition of university athletics. As far back as 1852, corpora-
tions were compensating the winners of intercollegiate athletic events.78
The first ever college football game featured four players whose aca-
demic eligibility was in question, and seven members of the University of
Michigan football team of the 1890s had "absolutely no connection with
the university. '79 In light of these early abuses, one might assume that
the NCAA was formed to instill amateurism in intercollegiate sports.
However, this is not the case. The NCAA was established in 1906 to
combat violence in college football.80
Many athletes find it difficult to understand why universities, television networks,
coaches, and many other people can make millions from college sport while athletes
themselves are routinely sanctioned for rule infractions like selling game tickets for
expense money. But it is poor and working-class athletes who are most likely to feel
the direct economic impact of NCAA policies. An athletic scholarship covers room,
board, tuition, and fees. It does not cover travel to and from school and other expenses
incurred by the average college student. Athletes from less affluent backgrounds may
view amateurism as a luxury they simply cannot afford.
Regarding black athletes, Sack states:
Over 30% of all black Americans live in poverty, and blacks have median incomes that
are only half those of whites. For many black Americans, sport is viewed as one of the
few avenues open for achieving financial success. Under these circumstances, it may be
unrealistic to expect blacks to embrace a nineteenth-century aristocratic ideology that
implies there is something morally suspect about accepting money for sport
participation.
Allan L. Sack, Are Improper Benefits Really Improper?, in TrH RULES OF THE GAME 71, 73
(Richard E. Lapchick & John Brooks Slaughter eds., 1989).
78. Montreal Railroad Company sponsored the first intercollegiate competition in the
United States, a crew race between Harvard and Yale. The company paid the expenses of
both teams and the winner received an expensive set of black walnut oars. In addition, college
track athletes routinely received cash prizes, and winners of rowing competitions received
cash prizes and silver goblets valued at twice what an average laborer might earn in a year.
Christopher L. Chin, Note, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of the Student-
Athlete, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1213, 1235 (1993). For a discussion of the commercialization of
college crew in the 1800s, see SMrH, supra note 73, at 26-51.
79. Chin, supra note 78, at 1235-36.
80. In 1892. Lorin F. Deland, who never actually played football but who had studied
military strategy, introduced football's most dangerous technique: the flying wedge. In this
maneuver, seven players would lock arms to form a V formation with the ball-carrier shielded
on the inside. These players would then get a 20-yard running start before blocking defenders
out of the way. A radical departure from football's habit of following English rugby, which
prohibited blocking, the flying wedge caused game injuries to increase dramatically. LAW-
RENCE, supra note 68, at 4-5. In 1905, 18 deaths and 149 serious injuries resulted from foot-
ball-related activities. Frank W. Carsonie, Comment, Educational Values: A Necessity for
Reform of Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics, 20 CAP. U. L. Rnv. 661, 666-67 (1991). Sixty-two
schools formed the Intercollegiate Athletic Association of the United States in 1906, which
changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) in 1910. Id. at 667.
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Second, the thirty-day rule does not advance the NCAA's goal to
offer a product that is distinct from professional sports teams. The ap-
peal of NCAA athletics is derived from its association with individual
schools and not from its reputation of amateurism.8 Alumni of schools
support their teams because of a bond that they feel with the university
and not because the players are not paid.81 Others support intercollegi-
ate athletics because of the rule differences between college and pro
teams, parity among teams, and the college atmosphere. If people sup-
ported sports teams based on ideals of amateurism, high school sports
would enjoy the greatest amount of popularity because these players re-
ceive no compensation. If college teams were supported based on their
amateur ideals, support of college athletics would have declined with the
multitude of NCAA rules violations that have occurred in recent de-
cades . 3 Because support of college athletics has soared despite its re-
81. Our fascination with the Olympic ideal - that sports should be performed by ama-
teur athletes strictly for the sheer love of sport - is misled. The Olympics, which started
around 800 B.C., ended in 343 A.D., and resumed in 1892, had nothing to do with amateurism.
Ancient Olympic champions were rewarded with prizes of astonishing value such as horses,
oxen, vases of precious olive oil, pensions, and tripods. According to Olympic scholar An-
drew Strenk: "The value of some awards would be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars
today." RICK TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE 49 (1989).
The concept of amateurism came not from the Olympics but from Victorian England,
where "those who had the time and money to engage in friendly matches of tennis, croquet,
archery, badminton, rowing, and the like certainly didn't want the yammering lower classes
participating with them and sullying the grandeur of their lawns, lakes, clubs, and universi-
ties." Thus, the line between amateur and professional did not come into existence to deline-
ate Olympic ideals, but rather, as stated by philosopher Paul Weiss, "the line between amateur
and professional is mainly a line between the unpaid members of the privileged class and the
paid members of an underprivileged class." Id. at 50.
82. Commenting on the lack of correlation between amateurism and the attractiveness of
intercollegiate athletics, Paul Lawrence notes:
Once, back at the turn of the century, professional athletes may have been so flagrantly
unscrupulous and so, well, proletarian that those who played sports for the pure enjoy-
ment of it needed recognition as a separate group or class. But this distinction, if it
ever existed, has long since disappeared. What, after all, really separates a professional
from a grand-in-aid athlete at a school with a major sports program? Both practice
long hours, both receive compensation for their athletic skills, and both participate in
multimillion dollar industries. The demarcation line blurs even more when NCAA
rules allow a student-athlete to turn pro in one sport but remain an amateur in another.
Thus, any difference between a student-athlete in a big-time sports program and a pro-
fessional athlete lies only in the amount of their compensation, not in any special qual-
ity the amateur enjoys and the professional lacks.
LAWRENCE, supra note 68, at 145.
83. From October 1952 to October 1983, the NCAA infractions committee considered
1,334 cases, 272 of which resulted in public reprimand, probation, or censure. Private repri-
mands were issued in an additional 573 cases in which there were minor violations insufficient
to warrant public reprimand. WLFORD S. BAILEY & TAYLOR D. LrITLETON, ATHLETICS AND
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cent scandals, one can only conclude that amateurism is not the element
of college sports that makes it attractive to the consumer.
Third, the NCAA has demonstrated that it has already sacrificed ed-
ucational goals for athletic success. 84 Therefore, its argument that the
professionalism of college sports will compromise educational values
flies in the face of its past actions.a5 Schools place tremendous pressure
on coaches to win, causing them to offer scholarships based on athletic
and not academic abilities. 6 The sacrifice of educational goals by uni-
versities is evidenced by several factors. First, the NCAA has rejected
rules prohibiting freshman eligibility, making the academic transition
from high school to college more difficult for entering athletes because
of the time requirements of participating in a sport.87 Second, the
ACADEME 21 (1991). Fifty-seven of the 106 NCAA Division I-A football programs were
either sanctioned, censured, or placed on probation during the 1980s. Goldman, supra note
74, at 207.
84. The hours that an athlete spends in promoting his team's success as opposed to the
hours that he or she spends in the classroom are astounding. The NCAA's estimate, that
"football and basketball players spend approximately 30 hours per week in their sports when
they are in season-more time than they spend preparing for and attending class combined,"
has been criticized as being too low. Most others report that basketball and football players
spend 50 to 60 hours per week on their respective sports. See MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE
SPORTS INC. 302-03 (1990).
85. The public's perception of the sacrifice of educational integrity for athletic achieve-
ment in big-time college athletics is evidenced by this well-worn joke in Stillwater, home of
Oklahoma State University:
How many Oklahoma University football players does it take to screw in a light bulb?
Only one, but he gets 3 hours of credit for it.
GARY D. FUNK, MAJOR VIOLATION 11 (1991).
86. Goldman, supra note 74, at 241.
87. During World Wars I and II and for one year of the Korean War, the NCAA allowed
freshman to compete in intercollegiate athletics to allow schools to complete their sports
schedules free from interruption in revenue. After the Korean conflict and until 1968, fresh-
men were barred from competition. However, the number of athletes that each school sup-
ported increased by 1967, forcing scholarships for noncompeting freshmen to become a
financial burden on schools. Universities concluded that if student-athletes were allowed to
compete for four years instead of three, they could award fewer scholarships, but gain the
same number of student-athlete years of participation. In 1968, universities voted to allow
athletes in all sports but football and basketball to compete as freshman. In 1972, the NCAA
expanded freshman eligibility to football and basketball. LAWRENCE, supra note 68, at 110-11.
A study of the issue of freshman eligibility in Division I men's basketball was proposed at
the 1990 NCAA contention. This proposal was made by the Special Committee on Basketball
Issues after a poll indicated that coaches heavily favored making freshmen ineligible. The
committee thought that freshman ineligibility would emphasize the basketball community's
commitment to educating student-athletes and provide players a better chance to adjust so-
cially, culturally, and athletically to the college atmosphere. The committee thought that a
study of the issue by the NCAA presidents commission and council would lead to legislation
for consideration at the 1991 NCAA convention. However, only one day after the debate of
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NCAA has prolonged football and basketball seasons, forcing athletes to
spend more time playing in revenue-producing games and less time on
academics. 88 Third, coach's salaries ordinarily exceed professor's sala-
ries, indicating that athletics are more important than academics.89
Fourth, successful coaches are ordinarily retained regardless of the aca-
demic performance of team members, indicating that success on the
court is more important than success in the classroom. 90 Fifth, many
games start late to accommodate television and not the best interests of
the players' academic performance. 91 Finally, the NCAA has aban-
doned four-year scholarships for one-year renewable scholarships, al-
lowing schools to not renew scholarships of players who are not
performing acceptably in their particular sport.'
The existence of other NCAA bylaws that are inconsistent with the
thirty-day rule shows that the NCAA does not view these rules as indis-
pensable. For example, the NCAA allows players that have been
drafted by both Major League Baseball and the National Hockey
League to retain their eligibility indefinitely while negotiating with the
the issue by members of the presidents commission, Division I members voted not to author-
ize the proposed study. BAILEY & LrrrLETON, supra note 83, at 122.
88. Goldman, supra note 74, at 241.
89. The average salary of a professor at a four-year institution is $50,420; the average
salary of the top 75 NCAA Division I basketball coaches is $195,467 in total income. FRANCIS
X. DEALY, JR., WIN AT ANY COST 165 (1990). The head football coach and men's basketball
coach at Ohio State each earn about $400,000 a year. The average salary of a full professor at
Ohio State, on the other hand, is $57,900 a year. SPERBER, supra note 84, at 151. In justifica-
tion of offering then football coach Jackie Sherrill $267,000 a year, the Texas A & M chairman
of the board of trustees stated: "Higher education is a business, and I think Sherrill's contract
is part of that process." Allen Guttman, The Anomaly of Intercollegiate Athletics, in R TmNK.
INO COLLEGE ATHLETIcs, 17, 21 (Judith Andre & David N. James eds., 1991).
90. A refreshing exception to this rule was presented by Paul G. Pearson, president of
Miami (Ohio) University, in defending his school's 0-7 football record. When asked if the
head football coach's job was in jeopardy, Pearson responded: "The difference here, sir, is that
even though people are upset about losing - I'm upset about losing - we don't fire coaches
because they lose. Our coaches know that so long as they do the best they can with the talent
they have, that they have a clean program and that their young men and women learn to study
and be students, they are O.K. We like winning. But a win without integrity is not a win."
TELANDER, supra note 81, at 56-57.
91. Goldman, supra note 74, at 241.
92. See Chin, supra note 78, at 1237. In 1973, the NCAA abandoned four-year scholar-
ships for one-year renewable scholarships under pressure from coaches who wanted the ability
to "fire" players for poor athletic performances. SPERBER, supra note 84, at 7. This action has
been characterized as "the most blatant example of college sport's disregard for the scholar-
ship athlete's education." Davis Meggyesy, Still Out of Their League, in THm RULES OF THE
GAME 113, 121 (Richard E. Lapchick & John Brooks Slaughter eds., 1989).
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respective professional leagues.93 This policy toward baseball and
hockey players directly contradicts the policy of only allowing college
basketball players a thirty-day window to negotiate with the NBA.9 4
Even if the NCAA could show that it had an interest in preserving
amateurism, providing a distinct product, or avoiding professionalism at
the expense of educational values, the NCAA still cannot show that the
thirty-day rule is designed to achieve these ends. Amateurism is pro-
tected by NCAA bylaws that prohibit athletes from being paid.95 As a
result, the thirty-day rule is only an unnecessary restraint on college
athletes.
After the NCAA's argument that its rules are designed to promote
amateurism has been refuted, it is obvious that the main purpose of the
thirty-day limitation presented by bylaw 12.2.4.2.1 is to promote the
NCAA's financial empire by keeping star basketball players in school,
93. Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARv. L. REv.
1299, 1313 (1992).
94. The NCAA rules are even harsher towards college football players. Under NCAA
bylaw 12.2.4.2:
An individual loses amateur status in a particular sport when the individual asks to be
placed on the draft list or supplemental draft list of a professional league in that sport,
even though:
(a) The individual asks that his or her name be withdrawn from the draft list prior to
the actual draft;
(b) The individual's name remains on the list but he or she is not drafted, or
(c) The individual is drafted but does not sign an agreement with any professional
athletics team.
Reprinted in NCAA MAr'uAL, supra note 12, at 73-74.
College basketball players are not governed by bylaw 12.2.4.2 because bylaw 122.4.2.1,
which established the thirty-day rule, is an exception to 12.2.4.2. College baseball and hockey
players do not lose their eligibility when drafted because Major League Baseball and National
Hockey League rules provide that a player does not need to be placed on a draft list prior to
being drafted, and therefore bylaw 12.2.4.2 is circumvented.
95. Under NCAA bylaw 12.1.1:
An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate
competition in a particular sport if the individual:
(a) Uses his or her athletic skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that
sport;
(b) Accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of
intercollegiate athletics participation;
(c) Signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regard-
less of its legal enforceability or any consideration received;
(d) Receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other
form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based upon athletic
skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; ....
Reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 12, at 70. The forms of "pay" prohibited by bylaw
12.1.1 are enumerated in NCAA bylaw 12.1.2. Id. at 70-71.
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and therefore, keeping the fans interest in college basketball at a high
level. The difference between the draft rules in basketball as compared
to the draft rules in baseball and hockey can be attributed to the reve-
nues that the respective sports bring to the NCAA. Basketball, along
with football, is one of its two cash cows, while baseball and hockey are
traditionally non-revenue sports.96 The courts should see through the
NCAA's rhetoric, strike down the NCAA's thirty-day rule, and allow
college basketball players to make career decisions in the same manner
as students who pursue non-athletic professions.
V. CONCLUSION
It's a [rule] that will allow college players to use the free enter-
prise system in the same way that the system has always used
them, to capitalize on the entertainment value skilled athletes
have in this sports-crazy society. It's a rule that will put athletes
on a par with the computer-science whizzes, music students,
drama majors and other collegians who can weigh pro careers
without losing their scholarships or eligibility for student activi-
ties. It's a rule that can get some of those sham students who are
simply using their schools as sports training camps out into the
real world where they belong. 7
The NCAA's thirty-day rule is a positive step toward alleviating the
restraints that the NCAA places on college basketball players. Now
players are at least able to test the NBA waters in determining whether a
step to the next level is a correct decision without immediately losing
their NCAA eligibility. However, the thirty-day time period does not
give players a sufficient time period to negotiate a contract, and the
NCAA's interests in promoting amateurism and academics are not fur-
thered by terminating a college basketball player's eligibility thirty days
after being drafted. Hopefully, the NCAA will open its eyes to the inter-
ests of the athletes and allow college basketball players to negotiate with
the NBA for an indefinite period of time. If the NCAA decides to pro-
tect its own pocketbook instead of the interests of the players, the courts
should realize that the NCAA's cries in support of promoting amateur-
ism are pure rhetoric, and should strike down the thirty-day rule on anti-
96. See generally Ethan Lock, Unreasonable NCAA Eligibility Rules Send Braxston Banks
Truckin', 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 643, 653 (1991).
97. Rick Telander, Relaxing the Ties that Bind At Last, Collegians May Be Able to Test the
Waters, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 12, 1990, at 94.
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trust grounds. Only then will athletes and non-athletes operate on a
level playing field when making career decisions.
JoHN P. GILLARD, JR.

